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ABSTRACT
Kaplan’s (1989a) solution to the indexical version of Frege’s Puzzle in terms of the character 
of linguistic expressions has been greatly influential and much discussed. Many philoso-
phers regard it as being correct, or at least as being on the right track. However, little has 
been said about how character is supposed to apply to proper names, and how it could 
account for the name version of the Puzzle. In this paper I want to fill this gap. I sketch some 
solutions to the name version of Frege’s Puzzle in terms of character, and argue that all of 
them are flawed in some way: they are either semantically implausible or fail to account for 
all relevant phenomena.
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Character, proper names, 
and Frege’s Puzzle
 Filipe Martone1
Take a look at the following sets of sentences, the first involving only coreferential indexicals 
and the second involving only coreferential proper names:
(1a) I am me [Bruce Wayne pointing at himself]
(1b) I am him [Bruce Wayne pointing at some footage of Batman on TV]
(1c) I fight criminals at night [said by Bruce Wayne in his Batman suit]
(1d) He fights criminals at night [said by Alfred pointing at Bruce Wayne]
(2a) Freddie Mercury is Freddie Mercury
(2b) Freddie Mercury is Farrokh Bulsara 
(2c) Freddie Mercury is talented
(2d) Farrokh Bulsara is talented
It seems clear that the cognitive values of those sentences are different, even though the 
singular terms they contain refer precisely to the same thing. Sentences (a) are trivial, while sen-
tences (b) appear informative. A  eaker can sincerely accept (c) sentences and at the same time 
sincerely reject (d) sentences (and vice-versa) without being irrational. But how is this possi-
ble? How can the mere substitution of coreferential expressions affect the cognitive value of a 
sentence? What accounts for the difference in their epistemic profiles if they refer to the same 
object? This is what is traditionally called Frege’s Puzzle.
Kaplan (1989a) managed to deal with the indexical version of the Puzzle quite well. In his the-
ory, indexicals have two levels of meaning: chara er and content. The content of an indexical is the 
contribution it makes to the proposition expressed. Since Kaplan is a referentialist, the content of an 
indexical just is the object being referred to. Chara er, on the other hand, is the linguistic rule that is 
attached to the indexical that determines the content in a context. More precisely, the chara er is a 
function from contexts to contents, and this function is associated with the indexical by the rules of 
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language. Because of this, it is plausible to think of it as the lin-
guistic meaning of indexicals that is known by every competent 
 eaker. Clearly, Kaplan cannot appeal to contents to account 
for the differences in cognitive value between sentences of the 
first set above, for they all have the same content. So, it must 
be the chara er, not the content, that explains cognitive value: 
since the chara ers of ‘I’ and ‘he’ are obviously different (they 
are different functions from contexts to contents: the chara er 
of ‘he’ is something like ‘the discriminated male’ and the char-
a er of ‘I’ is ‘the producer of this token’), and they are known by 
every competent  eaker, those sentences may differ in cognitive 
value even if they refer to the same object. They refer to the 
same thing, but, since their descriptive rules are distinct, they 
do so in different cognitively significant manners.2
The name version of the Puzzle, however, is nowhere 
near as amenable as its indexical version to a solution in terms 
of chara er. The reason for this is simple: for most referential-
ists (including Kaplan), names are just labels for their referents. 
There is no other level of meaning to a proper name other than 
the object that it stands for. In short, the meaning of a proper 
name is exhausted by its referent. If this is right, then all corefer-
ential names, no matter how synta ically distinct, have exactly 
the same meaning. Or, as Kaplan puts it, in proper names “all three 
kinds of meaning–referent, content, and chara er–collapse. 
[…] Because of the collapse of chara er, content, and referent, it 
is not unnatural to say of proper names that they have no mean-
ing other than their referent” (Kaplan, 1989a, p. 562). Therefore, 
there is no difference in meaning between ‘Farrokh Bulsara’ and 
‘Freddie Mercury’ that can be exploited by the referentialist in 
order to account for the difference in cognitive value of the sen-
tences in the second set above. All there is to the semantics of 
coreferential names is simply identical. How can one account for 
the cognitive value of proper names in terms of chara er, then3?
Kaplan himself acknowledges the difficulty (e.g. Kaplan, 
1989a, p. 562). His theory simply does not have enough re-
sources to solve Frege’s Puzzle as arising for names. In fact, this 
is a reason to su ect in principle his attempt to explain cogni-
tive value via chara er, even in the case of indexicals. If we have 
a phenomenon and a theoretical entity that purports to explain 
it, then the fact that this entity does not even begin to explain a 
recognized subclass of the same phenomenon gives us enough 
reason to su ect that it was not the entity that we were look-
ing for in the first place. Therefore, if chara er really has this 
supposed epistemic dimension, it should have this dimension 
for all singular terms, not only for indexicals. In other words: if 
cognitive value could plausibly be explained by chara er, then 
all phenomena of cognitive value should at least be initially 
treatable via chara er. But, in the case of proper names, they 
clearly are not. Chara ers seem ill suited to explain the cog-
nitive value of names right from the outset. If this is correct, 
then it looks like that the apparent relation between cognitive 
value and chara er in the case of indexicals that Kaplan was so 
enthusiastic about was merely incidental.
But let us not be so pessimistic. Perhaps Kaplan is wrong 
about proper names. Perhaps they do have more than one lev-
el of meaning besides the referent. If chara er and content in 
proper names do not coincide in the way that Kaplan believes 
they do, then maybe chara er is able solve the name version 
of the Puzzle after all. This, of course, is obviously a major 
deviation from Kaplan’s original theory. But, as we have seen, 
if the referentialist does not part ways with Kaplan regarding 
proper names, then she has no hope when it comes to solving 
the name version of the puzzle in terms of chara er.
There are several candidates for the chara ers of proper 
names, but it seems clear that all of them will be descriptions of 
some sort. Since chara ers are rules that determine the con-
tent, they must be given descriptively, just like the chara ers of 
indexicals. It is important to stress that this is in no way incom-
patible with direct reference. The biggest lesson we take from 
direct reference is that names are not equivalent to descrip-
tions at the level of content (i.e., they do not contribute descrip-
tive material to propositions). It is perfectly compatible with 
the general referentialist framework, then, for proper names 
to have a level of descriptive meaning  just as indexicals do. 
The descriptions that state the chara ers of proper names 
have to function like descriptions coupled with Kaplan’s dthat 
operator:4 they will express conditions that must be satisfied 
by an object in order for it to be their extension, but contrib-
ute only their extension to propositional content. In short, the 
dthat operator turns descriptions into directly referential terms. 
The chara er of a proper name, then, could very well function 
as a description of its bearer combined with a dthat operator.5
2 This is of course an oversimplified explanation. However, for the purposes of this paper, we do not need to go into further details.
3  One might wonder why Kaplan should care if his solution does not apply to proper names. The reason is the following. If one believes 
that cognitive value is an aspect of meaning, as Kaplan does, it is an extremely ad hoc move to claim that the same phenomenon is ac-
counted for by something semantic in the index ical case (i.e., by characters) and by something non-semantic in the case of proper names 
(e.g. non-semantic guises, as Salmon (1986) proposes, or anything pragmatic for that matter). Either cognitive value is an aspect of 
meaning or not. This is why proper names pose a difficult problem to referentialists who are sympathetic to Frege’s criterion of adequacy 
for semantics, i.e., the thesis that semantics must account for Frege’s Puzzle. And this is why Kaplan is so frustrated that his solution via 
character does not extend to proper names. In sum, if one shares the Fregean intuition that cognitive value is a feature of meaning, then 
one must show how something semantically relevant tracks differences in cognitive value adequately for all singular terms, not just for 
indexicals. Thanks to an anonymous referee for making me flesh this out more precisely.
4 Cf. Kaplan (1978, 1989a, p. 521-22, 1989b, p. 578-582). Kaplan says that dthat should be understood as a true demonstrative, nor as 
a real operator. For our purposes here, however, this does not make much difference.
5 Note that the dthat operator is not the same as the actually operator, which is usually appealed to by descriptivists about proper names 
to deal with Kripke’s objections. The former stays at the level of character, so to speak, while the latter carries over to content. In other 
words, the actually operator just rigidifies a description; it does not turn it into a directly referential term like dthat.
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However, contrary to indexicals, which have more or less 
easily statable descriptive chara ers, finding which descrip-
tions are good candidates for the chara ers of proper names 
is an enormously difficult task. Since these descriptions func-
tion as chara ers, they have to somehow be cognitively acces-
sible to all  eakers who are competent regarding the name 
in question, and they must be responsible for determining its 
referent. The options seem to be the following:
(1)  Causal-historical chain description
(2)  Specific-name metalinguistic description
(3)  Generic-name metalinguistic description
(4)  Context-sensitive description
Options (1) and (2) are more conservative, for they 
treat names as non-indexicals, i.e., as expressions whose 
chara er is constant and whose content does not depend 
on certain parameters of the context, exactly like Kaplan 
does. Options (3) and (4), on the other hand, treat proper 
names as indexicals, i.e., as expressions whose chara er is 
context-sensitive, and thus are a far cry from Kaplan’s theory. 
Let us begin by examining option (1).
Many people, including Kaplan, were convinced by 
Kripke’s causal-historical picture of how names refer. Ac-
cording to Kripke (1980), a given tokening of a name refers 
to the object it does because it is part of chain that goes back 
to an initial baptism, when the name was first introduced as 
the name of the baptized object. This name is passed on from 
 eaker to  eaker, and it is in virtue of being causally con-
nected to the object itself that my utterance of that name re-
fers to the precise object it does. In short, the reference is fixed 
externally, by the name’s ancestry, not by some fact internal 
to my cognition.
It is also important to stress that, in this picture, names 
are individuated in terms of baptism ceremonies. So two 
coreferential names are the same name if and only if they were 
introduced in the same ceremony. Conversely, two coreferen-
tial names are different if and only if they were introduced 
to the linguistic community in two different baptisms. Hence, 
to each name corresponds one and only one causal-histori-
cal chain, which originates in a baptism ceremony. A conse-
quence of this view is that, for example, a noun like ‘Ludovic’ 
will be systematically ambiguous: there is no single name 
‘Ludovic’, but as many different names– elled identically–as 
there have been baptism ceremonies. In fact, if the same person 
is named ‘Ludovic’ twice in two distinct ceremonies, there will 
be two distinct names  elt ‘Ludovic’, not a single one.6
Kaplan believes that the role of this causal chain is 
pre-semantic or, as he puts it, metasemantic (Cf. Kaplan, 1989b, 
p. 573). This means that the causal chain is not somehow built 
into the meaning of a given proper name; it functions only to 
determine which name is being used, and hence which thing is 
being referred to. So, on a given occasion of discourse in which 
a name is used, contextual cues determine which causal chain 
is being exploited, and thus which name is being tokened, in 
the same way that contextual cues determine the meaning 
of an ambiguous expression such as ‘bank’. This is completely 
different from the way in which context determines the con-
tent of an indexical expression: for indexicals, context-sensi-
tivity is built into their chara ers, and thus into their meanings, 
whereas names have a context-insensitive meaning. In other 
words, the referent of a name is not determined in virtue of 
an a ect of its meaning, but pre-semantically, by the chain 
that brought the name to the  eaker. Context is relevant only 
in determining which chain is being exploited. The context 
does not include a parameter to which the meaning of the 
name is sensitive. In short, for Kaplan, causal chains merely 
fix the referent in Kripke’s sense; they are not encoded in the 
name’s meaning.
Option (1) is the view that, contrary to Kaplan and 
Kripke, causal chains are in fact encoded in the name’s 
meaning. More precisely, they are encoded at the level of 
chara er. So, on this view, the chara er of a name ‘N’ would 
be given by a description such as ‘[dthat] the individual who 
lies at the other end of the historical chain that brought this 
token of “N” to me’. As Kaplan puts it, such a theory will 
“regard the historical chain theory as a part of semantics, 
as giving the meaning rather than as telling us how to dis-
cover it” (Kaplan, 1989b, p. 574). If this is plausible, then 
names would have two layers of meaning after all: the char-
a er, which is given by a description of the causal chain that 
introduced the name to the community, and the content, 
which is exhausted by its referent.
This is why sentences like (2a), (2b), (2c), and (2d) 
have different epistemic profiles. Since the names ‘Freddie 
Mercury’ and ‘Farrokh Bulsara’ have clearly distinct causal 
histories, they have distinct chara ers. If they have distinct 
chara ers, and chara er is tied to cognitive value, then they 
have different cognitive values. Voilà: sentences (2a), (2b), 
(2c), and (2d) differ in cognitive value even though they 
have the same content.
There are two main problems with this solution. The 
first has nothing to do with Frege’s Puzzle, however. It is about 
the cognitive role that causal chain descriptions supposedly 
play. The chara ers of indexicals are more intuitively con-
ceived as linguistic meanings because they are, in some sense, 
gra ed by every  eaker of the language. And the descrip-
tions that state these chara ers are fairly simple. Causal de-
scriptions, on the other hand, are much more complex and 
seem much more cognitively demanding. It is not very intu-
itive to say that causal descriptions are rules that have to be 
mastered by competent  eakers for the correct use of names: 
they require substantive beliefs about baptisms, causal con-
nections, linguistic communities, etc. These sorts of beliefs 
may or may not be required for the linguistic pra ice in gen-
eral. But so are beliefs about sounds, symbols, behaviors and 
6 This is essentially Kaplan’s example of the mischievous Babylonian. Cf. Kaplan (1990).
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all sorts of beliefs about the world which are not built into 
meanings. The idea that the chara er of a name is a descrip-
tion of its causal chain, then, is somewhat implausible. 
Second, and more seriously, this proposal does not solve 
Frege’s Puzzle for names even if it is semantically plausible. 
Consider the following situation described by Kaplan: 
I may introduce a new proper name word 
and send it on its journey. When it returns 
to me–perhaps slightly distorted phono-
logically by its trip through other dialects–I 
can competently take it into my vocabulary 
without recognizing it as the very same 
word! Shocking! (Kaplan, 1989a, p. 563).
If option (1) is right, there is just one baptism ceremony 
in this case, so there is just one name with a single chara er, 
call it ‘N’. When I encounter this name again, it may never-
theless be informative for me to be told that ‘N is N’, even 
though I was the one who introduced it in the first place. The 
name does not even have to be phonologically distorted; it 
can be  elt and pronounced in the exact same way as when I 
introduced it. This also occurs in Paderewski-like scenarios.7 
It may be informative for me to be told that ‘Paderewski is Pa-
derewski’ even though both occurrences of the name exploit 
the same causal chain and thus have the same chara er. How 
can this be possible?
Option (1), then, seems barely tenable as a solution to 
Frege’s Puzzle. Option (2) seems a little more plausible, but 
it suffers from the same problem when it comes to explain-
ing informativeness. This option presupposes much of the 
causal-historical picture of how names are individuated, but 
the descriptions that state the chara ers of names are much 
less cognitively demanding than descriptions of causal chains. 
They are metalinguistic descriptions like ‘[dthat] the bearer of 
‘N’’. As seems clear, this description is a piece of knowledge 
that everyone acquires upon learning a new name, so they 
can more plausibly function as cognitively accessible charac-
ters. Note that in option (2) names are  ecific, i.e., they are 
individuated in terms of the baptisms by which they were 
introduced. As explained earlier, on this kind of view there 
is no single name ‘Ludovic’ with a single meaning, but many 
different names  elled identically, each with one single 







’, etc. So, for example, the char-
a er of ‘Ludovic
1
’ would be ‘[dthat] the bearer of ‘Ludovic
1
’’, 
which would be different from ‘the bearer of ‘Ludovic
2
’’, and 
so on. This guarantees that the description picks out the right 
individual, because the causal chain determines which  ecif-
ic name is loaded into the chara er, and the chara er then 
determines the content. This explains why it can be informa-




’: their chara ers are 
given by different descriptions, since different names occur in 
them. However, Paderewski cases are also left unaccounted 
for by this proposal. Since the causal chain pre-semantically 
individuates one single name, ‘Paderewski
1
’ (because he was 
baptized only once, presumably), the same chara ers would 





tence should be trivial, but it is not.
Let us now look at option (3). As mentioned above, this 
option treats names as indexicals. This is already very suspi-
cious. As Kaplan says, “those who suggest that proper names 
are merely one  ecies of indexical depreciate the power 
and the mystery of the causal chain theory” (Kaplan, 1989a, 
p. 563). But let us give it a shot. In this view, names are not in-
dividuated by baptisms. They are conceived as generic nouns. 
Thus, a generic name like ‘Paderewski’ (or ‘Ludovic’) will have 
a single, context-sensitive chara er–‘[dthat] the bearer of ‘Pad-
erewski’’–which will refer to whoever is called ‘Paderewski’ in 
the context of its use. In other words, this option attributes 
to the generic name ‘Paderewski’ one univocal metalinguistic 
and context-sensitive meaning, which determines its content 
in a context. Generic names, then, function exactly like index-
icals such as ‘here’ and ‘I’. 
Needless to say, this option is not very persuasive in its 
own right. Generic names do not appear to have meanings by 
themselves without being associated with a particular object; 
generic names are precisely that: generic8. Moreover, if there is 
just one single chara er for every possible occurrence of ‘Pad-
erewski’, we will run into serious semantic problems. Suppose 
that there are two different men called ‘Paderewski’ in a given 
context. If I say ‘Paderewski is taller than Paderewski’, both 
occurrences of the generic name ‘Paderewski’ in that sentence 
will have the same chara er in the same context, and hence 
should determine the same content. In short, this sentence 
would refer to the same man twice, and thus would express 
a contradiction. This is obviously absurd, because what I 
said is perfectly reasonable, and may even be evidently true. 
To avoid this problem, we will have to say either that (a) the 
context shifts midsentence, guaranteeing that each occur-
rence of ‘Paderewski’ refers to a different individual, or (b) 
that the chara ers of each occurrence of ‘Paderewski’ are 
somehow different, so that different objects are determined 
by them; otherwise, this sentence will always come out false.
However, if we maintain that (a) the context shifts 
midsentence while the chara er of ‘Paderewski’ remains the 
same, then there should never be any informative occurrence 
of ‘Paderewski is Paderewski’. In other terms, every possible 
occurrence of ‘Paderewski is Paderewski’ will trigger a shift in 
7 Cf. Kripke (2011) for his exposition of the famous Paderewski case.
8 If one defends the predicate view of names, as Burge (1973) and Fara (2015) do, then generic names do have meanings; they function 
like predicates that are true of objects that have those names (thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out). I find this position 
extremely counter-intuitive, but I will not argue against it here. In fact, I suspect that, even if such views are plausible, they would still 
suffer from the same kind of problem in accounting for Frege’s Puzzle as the views I am discussing.
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context; but, since the chara ers remain identical, every oc-
currence of this sentence should turn out trivial. But clearly 
there are non-trivial occurrences of ‘Paderewski is Paderews-
ki’, as Kripke argued. In order to explain cognitive value in 
terms of chara er, there cannot be a difference in cognitive 
value without a difference in chara er. So, saying that the 
context shifts midsentence solves a semantic problem (it 
guarantees that the right individuals are picked out), but this 
view fails to account for Frege’s Puzzle.
Alternatively, we can say that (b) the chara er of ‘Pa-
derewski’ changes in each occurrence of the name, while the 
context remains the same. This would force us, however, to 
hold that chara ers are occurrence individuated, i.e., that each 
new occurrence of the name will produce a different char-
a er. Remember, this is required in order for the theory to 
deliver the correct result: if the chara ers in ‘Paderewski is 
taller than Paderewski’ are not individuated in terms of their 
occurrences, this sentence will always express a contradic-
tion. But we cannot consistently and in a non-ad-hoc way 
maintain that chara ers are occurrence individuated just for 
these problematic cases. They are not semantically  ecial in 
any sense. Hence, chara ers must be occurrence individuat-
ed for all cases. Note that this view delivers the correct result 
even for cases where two distinct occurrences refer to the 
same object. Suppose I do want to express a contradiction 
with ‘Paderewski is taller than Paderewski’. There is noth-
ing semantically implausible about two distinct chara ers 
determining the same content in the same context, thus de-
livering the intended contradiction – just as I can say ‘I am 
taller than him’ while pointing to a mirror. This is perfectly 
in line with Kaplan’s framework: two different chara ers can 
determine the same object in the same context, but not nec-
essarily so. If this is right, however, there should never be an 
uninformative case of ‘Paderewski is Paderewski’. Since every 
numerically distinct occurrence of ‘Paderewski’ would pro-
duce a different chara er, then they should always have dif-
ferent epistemic profiles. Yet this is clearly false, for there are 
trivial cases of ‘Paderewski is Paderewski’ (when Paderews-
ki himself utters this sentence, for example). We also have 
no compelling semantic reasons to say that the chara ers 
of ‘Paderewski’ are identical in trivial cases and different in 
informative ones. Aside from considerations about cognitive 
value, those cases have no significant semantic differences 
that justify  ecial semantic treatment.
This leaves option (4). On this view, names function 
just like indexicals, but their chara ers vary from  eaker to 
 eaker or even for the same  eaker in different occasions. 
Each  eaker, then, attributes her own chara er to a given 
name in a given context, and this chara er determines the 
content. In a sense, this view is very similar to Fregean and 
Russellian descriptivism: each  eaker associates one defi-
nite description with a name in a context of use, and this 
description determines the referent. Just like tradition-
al descriptivism, in option (4) there is no single privileged 
description community-wise or even  eaker-wise; as long 
as the referent remains the same, there is (apparently) no 
problem. The main difference is that, contrary to tradition-
al descriptivism, these descriptions are not encoded in the 
propositional content of sentences containing names; they 
are turned into directly referential terms and are confined 
to the level of chara er. So, for instance, if I say ‘Socrates 
is a great person’ and associate the description ‘the greatest 
soccer player from Ribeirão Preto’ with ‘Socrates’, its charac-
ter will be something like ‘[dthat] the greatest soccer player 
from Ribeirão Preto’ for me. The content, of course, would 
be just Socrates himself. Similarly, my audience may asso-
ciate different descriptions, and thus different chara ers, 
with the same name. In other words, this view claims that 
chara ers vary contextually, based on the sort of informa-
tion the  eaker has about the referent and what sort of in-
formation is relevant in the context of communication. 
This is why ‘Paderewski is Paderewski’ can be informa-
tive to me: I associate different descriptions with each occur-
rence of the name, and thus the chara er of this sentence 
would be something like ‘[dthat] the pianist called ‘Paderews-
ki’ is [dthat] the statesman called ‘Paderewski’’. The proposi-
tional content is just a self-identity, but the chara ers of the 
two occurrences of the name ‘Paderewski’ are different, so it 
is an informative self-identity. And this also explains why the 
same sentence can be trivial: if I associate the same chara er 
with both occurrences of ‘Paderewski’, then ‘Paderewski is Pa-
derewski’ will turn out to be uninformative to me. 
In sum, then, this view claims that the chara ers of 
names are only determined in the  eaker’s idiolect by the 
information she has, not by general rules of language. More-
over, proper names turn out to be mere placeholders for defi-
nite descriptions, for they do not have constant meanings 
at the level of chara er, much like the dthat operator itself. 
Because this view is so similar to Fregeanism and Russel-
lianism about proper names, they solve Frege’s Puzzle more 
or less in the same manner. Additionally, this view manages 
to avoid Kripke’s modal arguments, because the description 
associated with a name is not expressed at the level of con-
tent. These descriptions are also not merely rigidified: they 
are turned into genuine directly referential expressions by 
something like the dthat operator. Finally, contrary to Ka-
plan’s theory, chara ers of names will no longer be constant 
functions, but merely functions from contexts to contents 
just like any other indexical.
However, though it avoids Kripke’s modal argument, op-
tion (4) does not avoid his semantic argument. If it is my job 
to associate a description, and thus a chara er, with a name 
on an occasion of use, then my utterance will determine the 
wrong object if I associate the wrong information with the 
name. Think of the name ‘Einstein’. If I associate the descrip-
tion ‘the father of the atomic bomb’ with it, then its chara er 
will be ‘[dthat] the father of the atomic bomb’ and will pick out 
whoever satisfies this description. This chara er, of course, 
does not determine Einstein, but Oppenheimer. Therefore, 
the proposition I express will be a proposition about Oppen-
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heimer, and not about Einstein. This, of course, runs counter 
to well-e ablished arguments about reference-determina-
tion for proper names. Moreover, we intuitively say that I 
have false beliefs about Einstein, not that I am thinking and 
saying true things about Oppenheimer. If chara ers of prop-
er names are determined internalistically, in my idiolect, then 
it is always possible for my utterances to determine the wrong 
objects if I have mistaken beliefs about them.
Additionally, this picture makes communication very 
mysterious. If the chara ers of names are potentially mul-
tiplied by all the  eakers in a given situation, how do we 
explain their grasp of what is said? If there is no significant 
overlap between the information  eakers associate with the 
name uttered in a given occasion, then the route to refer-
ence will be so different for each of them that it seems very 
hard to explain how they arrive at the same content and 
know that they do so. In fact, it seems rather miraculous. 
As with indexicals, we intuitively say that it is the job of the 
 eaker to exploit a single chara er that must be gra ed and 
interpreted by the audience. In short, reference seems to be 
a two-place relation between  eaker (or expression-in-con-
text) and reference, not an n-place relation between every 
single person in a communication exchange and the refer-
ent. Of course, we may associate a huge body of information 
with a given name, but to claim that we also express or display 
this information through an utterance of this name, even if 
this is done via chara er, is hard to swallow. Worse yet, if 
I have conflicting individuating information about a given 
object, I refer successfully to it only if I happen to associate 
the right description when I use it; otherwise, I will refer to 
something else. Not even my own uses of the name will be 
consistent, on this view.
It seems, then, that all options for explaining the name 
version of Frege’ Puzzle in terms of chara er are flawed in 
some sense. They either fail to account for cognitive value or 
are semantically implausible. This brings us back to the point 
I raised at the beginning of the paper: if chara er is unable to 
account for the cognitive value of proper names successfully, 
then we have serious reasons to su ect that it also fails to 
account for the cognitive value of indexicals. Kaplan’s solution 
to the indexical version of Frege’s Puzzle certainly seems plau-
sible, but close scrutiny may reveal that the apparent relation 
between chara er and cognitive value is only accidental. But 
this is a matter for another investigation.
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